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• Table 3:Victim 
Assikstance 
Planning. 
• Table 4: Funding 
2002-2003. 
Serial Activity Duration 
1. Implementing the victim ns~ isrcmcc strnlegy 2003 
2. Pn,,·i<l1 ru! a<IV<)Cacv ror victim~ 2001--.2()()5 
J. Treating 30 upper-limb amputees per year , including three sight impaired 2003- 2005 
victims abroad 
4. Provision of raw materials to the Tirana Orthopedic Centre wtth ICRC 2l.XJ.~-2005 
support 
5. Treating 30 lowcr ·limb victims in Albania per year with ICRC support 2003-2005 
6. Training three dot:tors fromrHJTihc.astcm Alhauia ill a'h;mccd surg:ical 2001~2005 
oroccdurcs (trauma ;md amputations) O\'Cr three yrs 
7. lmorovinu suruical facilities in northeastern All~tnia 2003-~ 
8. Training six orthopedic tcclmicians in upper-limb prosthc.scs and 2003-2005 
Ot1hothcscs 
9. Tmininu or six ducto"/nnrse' in basic physiothcmpy 2003- 2005 
10. Conducting a stu·"cy to detcrm.inc further areas of ccouomic integration of 2003 
the families of 2-13 victims 
.t l. Prtwiding micro-fin:mcc to :·1ssis1 with rcinrcgral iun of , ·it:tims, basil:t.tlly 2<XJ3-200.5 
bcc-kecoin• and animal husbandry 
12. Transitional strategy implemented to ensure a sustainable Albanian victim 2003-2005 
assistance ca >acit\' is in -place by 2005 
















f-~TIVITY F UNDING 2002 BUDGET2003 MOBILISED SHORTFALL 
-Capadl)' Building 1::--mr: Sl l9.ooo ~20,000 DR D $225,000 $100,000 
and Coordinatiou of u IT!': $27,000 l Tj\'fJP $90,000 
mine- action Dl ·m: S 125,000 (2002) 
(lmplemeuted b.r Total : ~271 ,1~X l ITF $S,I MXI (2(K)2) 
UNDP1 
Tcrhnlcnl survev S2,000,000 Ell plcduc €2 m 
Oemiuing FSO Ll rn·: :sJJo.uoo :,1,000,000 bU. Ucrmany and 
S witLcrlaud : $330.000 ITf< S I ,000.000 
( icnnan) I H ~LP: 
S300,1XXJ 
I ·SD; S70.mO 
Total: S I ,030.000 
Demlnlng DCA- .\ C l' ll<~land: $350,000 $ 1.300,000 S I ,000,000 mostly $300,000 
ACT IX:.\ -. \ CT: $363.700 from Ell rmd 
Danida: 5297,895 marching funds 
l ·.s .: :>43.500 from ITF 
l .n\.emhonrg: .$48.000 
O ther: S I S8.900 
Tntal : 5 1,261,995 
V ir1 im Assislluu· ,. ITF ~IOO,()(lO S2.'i5,000 $ 140,0(Xl. pk><lgcs $115,000 
ICI~C: $35.000 from ITF and 
T<•tal : $ 135 ,000 ICRC 
MKE l ·"ll'LI-: )71 ,000 $\13,000 $30.000 $63,000 
(UNICEF 
pled11.e?) 
TOTAL $!,698.000 $5,068,000 $4,490,000 $578000 
Rehabilitatio n Ins titute with ITF 
ass istance. T wclve victims were assisted by 
the IC RC ro set up small enterprises. 
Several laws now afford the disabled 
spec ial privileges. The Albanian 
monthly disability pension was recently 
increased. A broad integra ted victim 
assistance strategy was adopted in 
Albania. The goal of this strategy is to 
build a sustainable Albanian mine action 
capability by 2005. Irs objectives are to: 
• Fit prostheses to priority lower-limb 
ampurees in Albania. 
• Fir prostheses to upper-limb 
amp utees abroad (Slovenia). 
• Rehabili t a te sight- impai red 
victi ms abroad. 
• Bui ld the capacity of Albanian 
institutions ro fir all types of prostheses 
and orthoses in Albania by 2005. 
• Build a victim rehabilitation 
capacity in Albania by 2005. 
• Develop the capacity in north-
eas tern AI bani a to surgically rrea.r trauma 
and amputee victims and serve as a level 
th ree medical facility for v ictims of 
demining accidents. 
•Conduct economic reintegration of 
mine victims through a micro-financing 
scheme. 
The main goal of victim assistance 
planning from 2003 is ro establish an 
Albanian capacity by 2005. (see Table 3). 
Transition Strategy 
The Albanian government will 
assume almost full responsibility of 
its mine action programme by the end 
of 2005 . After 2005 , there will be a 
reduced mine action programme allowing 
for a leaner structure wirh only low-impact 
areas left to de mine. An Albanian capacity 
for demining and victim assistance will be 
• 64 • 
fully establish ed by 2005; the MRE 
objectives will mostly have been reached 
and a solid resource mobiLisation base will 
have been established. 
Funding 
Previous and current donors include 
the UNDP, EU, DFID, ITF, ICRC, and 
the Canadian, Danish, German, Swiss, 
Turkish and U.S. governments. In June 
2002, the EU reached a consensus to fund 
mine action in Albania "as far as possible" 
through the CARDS programme (Inte-
grated Border Management Project). Of 
the $5.068 million budget for 2003, $4.49 
million has already been funded, leaving 
a shortfall of $0.578 million The roral 
budget for rhe ensuing years until 2005 
will be around $3.9 million per annum. 
Conclusions 
There is a significant mine and UXO 
threat in northeastern Albania, but there 
is also an increased awareness and 
co mmitment to solving rhe problem. 
The year 2002 was the rurning point 
for the Albania mine action programme, 
and 2003 will be crucial. Albania can now 
ser rhe pace in the region on issues such as 
stockpile destruction. The focus this year 
will be on accurately determining the 
extent of rhe mine and UXO problem 
an d initiating the transition strategy to 
realise rhe strategic objective of making 
Albania free from mines and UXO by 2005.1 
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In the Name of Humanity 
A recent study of the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) mine action programme 
concentrated on the effective use of donations from political, financial and 
prod uctivity perspectives. The premise of the study was that similar tasks, 
undertaken by a similar work force, with similar training and equipment, in 
the same time period, should be achieved with comparable timeframes and 
costs. Results and analysis of the BiH programme from the past several 
years are discussed below. 
by Eddie Banks, 
Project Director~ E and I 
Introduction 
The continued suffering inflicted by 
landmines and UXO must be eliminated 
in the shortest possible t ime period; 
indeed, the international community 
acknowledges that obligation. The Ottawa 
Treaty, Dayton Peace Agreement and the 
London and Bonn Peace Implementation 
Conferences all form legal obligations 
add ress ing mine action that BiH has 
formally agreed to. BiH was the first Balkans 
country to destroy its entire stockpile of 
AP mines, wi th the exception of a few 
mines for tra ining and research and 
development (R&D), allowed within 
the terms of the Ottawa Convention. 
Underpi nning the obligation to 
eliminate landmines is the financial sup-
port provided by the donor community 
tO assist less affluent countries in meet-
ing their legal and moral obligations. By 
removing the cause of the landmine 
threat quickly, other aspects of hu-
manita rian ass istan ce and national 
development such as repa tri a tion, 
rehabi litation, reco nstruc tion and 
reconciliation, can proceed unimpeded in 
areas that were suspected of, or contained 
hazardou s material. Therefore, the 
essen rial requirements of speed, safety, 
qual ity and effectiveness to address the 
legal, moral, ethical, humanitarian and de-
velopment objectives are unquestionable. 
Iris essential that funds allocated for 
mine action , both international and 
national, are utilised in a balanced manner, 
integrating international objectives with 
those of th e afflicted nation. Although 
saving lives and limbs is of paramount 
importance, there is also a requirement 
for funds to be allocated to advocacy, test 
and evaluation, R&D, information tech-
nology and programme management. 
Once global and national plans are agreed 
upon, it is critical that allocated funds are 
utilised in the most cost-effective 
manner. So why is it that in some cases 
more funding is consistently available for 
institutional support than for the removal 
of the problem? Why is it that in BiH, 
commercial organisations completed 
more tasks, destroyed more mines and 
cleared greater areas at dramatically lower 
costs per square m eter than non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs)? If 
we are truly humanitarian, why do 
many donors appear uninteres ted in 
performance, or in monitoring or improving 
the effective utilisation of their funds? 
While politicians, institutions and 
individuals talk about the slow progress 
of mine clearance and the decades that it 
wi ll take, it is rare to hear these same 
groups demand more effective utilization 
of donations. Globally, we seem more 
preoccupied with international objectives 
su ch as International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS), lnfomiarionManagement 
System for Mine Action (IMSMA), craining 
schools and a range of issues that ra rely 
con tribu te to national programmes' 
arrempts ro rid their cow1try oflancLnines. 
Only a few voices have been raised in 
protest, claiming that the contributions 
provided by the international community 
could have, if properly directed, cleared a 
far greater area than has been achieved. 
W hile this study addressed a number of 
issues to do with background, financial, 
political and structural elements of the 
BiH programme, and proposed a more 
business-like response to mine action, the 
main emphasis was on the performance 
of the various types of organisations. The 
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results of the study identified a number 
of negative factors, including conflicting 
political objectives, institutional rivalry 
and organisational managemenr requiring 
donor support that is disproportionate to 
its limited output. 
Data Collection and 
Performance Comparison 
Performance 
In order to undertake a full compari-
son between various organizations with 
differing methodology, structure and 
financ ia l su ppo rt, su ch as En tity 
Arm ies, C ivil Protection units, NGOs 
and commercial com pan ies, i t was 
necessary to have detailed information 
on a range of factors. Some of these 
factors are no t fu lly known primarily 
because a number of in ternat ional in-
stitutions and organisations re fu sed 
to provide such informati o n, wh ile 
stating that t hey operate in a "totally 
transparent and accountable manner. " A 
number of sources confi rm this fact , 
including recent United Nations Develop-
ment Program (UNDP) and European 
Union (EU) studies and the £ailed attempts 
by our study team to obtain information 
that should have been in the public 
d omain. However, utilising an independent 
database (with information from the 
national database as its foundation), 
as well as financial data and independent 
work collected over a six-year period, 
including daily performance data for 
machines, explosive d etecting dogs 
(EDDs) and manual demining; a con-
siderable amount of data was collected 
and analysed. In addition, a detailed study 
on demining accidents was also used as 
part of the data collection and analysis. 
Comparison of the data acknowl-
edged the differences between organiza-
tions , and a common approach was 
adopted in order to create a level-playing 
field . The study avoided the complex 
issue of factoring, and concentrated 
instead o n aspects that were similar, 
easily measurable and explainable, and 
that provided outputs that could be 
1
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analysed. It was also recognized that 
commercial companies include all aspects 
in their costs, including profit margins, 
while NGOs could utilise multiple 
donations for rhe same project and might 
have equipment donated, and/or replen-
ished, through additional donations, 
rhus considerably reducing operational 
costs. In addition, because NGOs do nor 
make a profit, it could be reasonably 
expected that their costs should be 
considerably less than those of their 
commercial counterparts. The study results 
demonstrated that this was nor the case. 
Selection of 
Implementing Groups 
A number of performance-related 
exercises were undertaken rhar highlighted 
marked differences berween various types 
of organisations, bur also noticeable 
similarities berween organisations. The 
study team grouped similar organisations 
together and classified them as Com-
mercial, NGO (both international and 
national), National NGO (NNGO), 
Civil Protection and Entity Armies. The 
individual groups are self-explanatory, 
bur the use of rwo groups for NGOs 
should be explained. In late 1998, the 
Commission for Deminingsupporred the 
establishment of three NNGOs, repre-
senting the different ethnic groups in 
BiH. They were initially supported by the 
U.S. State Deparrmenr through the 
International Trust Fund (ITF). They 
were established to be non-profit bur 
commercially orientated; in other words, 
they were expected to be both productive 
and cost-effective. Their results proved 
conclusively that NGOs can be as efficient, 
productive and effective as commercial 
organisations, bur at a lower cost per sq 
meter, if rhey are properly managed. 
Funding 
While the funding problems of the 
BiH programme (1997 -1999) are well 
known, asare the allegations of corruption 
against the BiH Commission for 
Demining, it is sufficient to note that 
even after months of investigation, no 
evidence of corrupt action or improper 
use of power has been produced. However, 
the effects of the continuous reference to 
this subject by a number of members of 
the international community caused 
donors to rake independent action that 
affected the structural components of 
the national programme, delaying and in 
many cases denying donations that had 
been planned to be utilised in BiH. The 
impact of these allegations on the BiH 
programme was measurable, immense 
and extremely negative. The results of 




late 1997, 1998 and early 1999, when 
commercial funding was at its highest, 
yet the majority of commercial tasks were 
started in the worst period for effective 
demining. The total of all tasks started 
in this five-month period (1996-2002) 
was I ,067 while in the most favourable 
months, (March and April, Ocrober and 
November) only 726 tasks were initiated. 
A separate subject is the use of funds 
to support institutional requirements 
such as schools, IMAS , IMSMA, and the 
support of institutions that have been 
o Commercial 
• Non Commer cial 
• NNGO 
I Figure 1: Analysis of the BiH Programme from March 2003. 
The allegations against the BiH 
Commission for Demining were first 
circulated in early 1999, and the impact 
on commercial demining is almost 
immediately evident. Ind eed the 
commercial tasks, being undenaken 
at considerably lower costs than the non-
commercial tasks, gradually fell from 312 
tasks in 1998 ro 108 in 2002. The non-
commercial tasks increased to 177 in 
1999 and gradually fell to around 133 in 
2002; however, their funding increased 
during rhis period. In addi rion, the 
Entity Army and Civil Protection elements 
with more than 600 deminers, started 
work in 1999. With an increase in financial 
support and with more than double the 
commercial workforce, a considerable 
increase in output should have taken 
place-not a decrease. 
Other factors can also resrricr effectiveness. 
For instance, inadequate understanding of 
prioririsarion criteria, especially by 
procurement and fund managers, results 
in the optimum period for work being 
missed. This is particularly apparent in 
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initiated without a cost-benefit assessment. 
In BiH in 2003, more finance will likely 
be spent supporting these institutional 
requirements than on the removal of mines. 
Seasonal Performance 
Based on the Clearance 
Method 
By adding the various performance 
figures of the programme, season by 
season or year by year, an assessment 
of improved or decreased performance 
was achieved and an average performance 
figure obtained. While many non-
commercial organisations had machines 
and EDDs, the statistical data illustrates 
rhar they did little to improve performance. 
In a munber of cases, commercial equipment 
was used in an attempt to improve non-
commercial performance. In a large 
number of cases, this additional cost 
failed to produce a significant improvement. 
A separate study was also undertaken to 
assess the most effective methods from a 
rime, effort and cost basis. The results illustrated 
rbar the manual and manual/machine 
methods were the most costly and rime 
consuming, while the manuai/EDD and 
rnanuai/EDD/machine methods were, 
depending on the vegetation, the most 
effective from a cost, rime and effort per-
spect ive. While the commercial 
organisations and the NNGOs utilised 
the most productive methods, the non-
commercial organisations tended to prefer 
the more rime-consuming and costly 
method of manual and mechanical! 
manual demining. 
Ana lysis of Data: Effort 
Commercial and NNGO organisations 
do nor employ staff if there is no work, and 
rarely does any contract have more than a 
few rasks. Non-commercial organisations 
on the other hand, rend to retain their 
staff for the complete year. This means 
rhat holidays are part of their contractual 
obligations. In addition, if there is nor a 
seamless work plan (moving reams from 
one sire ro rhe next with no downtime) 
rhey encounter additional delays with no 
ourpur (measured by sq meters cleared). 
Most commercial and NNGOs tend to 
use an eight-man team, including the 
ream leader and medical orderly, increas-
ing and decreasing the number of 
deminers when necessary. In 1997 and 
1998, rhe United Nations had reams of 
20 per sire, the UN High Commission 
for Refugees (UNHCR) had reams of30 
and rhe Entity Armies usually had reams 
of ten. These numbers were utilised re-
gardless of how effective the respective 
demining reams were. A table of the sq 
meters cleared, tasks completed and 
days to complete the tasks is derailed 
in Table I. 
Analysis of Data: Methods 
Based on previous work on perfOrmance 
analysis, a simple comparison addressing 
the various methods was conducted to 
ascertain the improvements that both 
EDDs and machines, used in conjunc-
tion with the manual process, provide. If 
operational costs are added to the equa-
tion, then a firm understanding of what 
each task actually costs and rhe cost ben-
efits of using an integrated approach, 
where feasible, was obtained. The effec-
tive use of any method depends on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the man-
agement of rhe selected methods. Sound 
management of an integrated system (the 
use of more than one method) maintains 
a high safety and quality standard while 
improving productivity and cost effective-
ness. Poor management will certainly 
complicate rhe operational control, bur 
just as importantly, it will increase the 
hazard, rime and effort required; there-
fore, negatively affecting safety, quality 
and cost. EDDs that are nor in opera-
tional use still require feeding, husbandry 
and training-this simply adds to the 
fixed costs without any impact on pro-
duct ivity. One non-commercial 
organisation had EDDs from 1997 bur 
has failed to use them effectively. Anum-
ber of orher non-commercial 
organisations have used commercial 
EDD assets, bur were unable to manu-
ally prepare EDD boxes in sufficient 
quantity due to the low productivity of 
their manual demining process. 
Even machines rhar stand idle incur 
maintenance costs. In commercial circles, 
the large outlay for purchase demands 
rhar a certain production level be obtained 
Year Organisation Total Task Total No Aveyage Avevage AvgNo. 
Type (sq m Or Tasks Sq m pe;~ No. Day/task 
cleaued) Tusk Tusk 
Ouys 1996 Commercial 
2002 A vcragc figure 20,971,472 1,182 17,742 27,805 23.5 
199<) NNGOs 
2002 A vcrage fjoure 2,414,930 82 29,450 3,645 44.5 
1997 NGOs 
2002 ..-\ vcragc figure 5,615,870 310 18,116 27,751 89.5 
199<) Civil Protection 
2002 A vcragc fig w-e 1,697,566 213 7,970 17,197 80.7 
19')<) Entity Armies 
..1002 A \ 'Craoc fi ourc 4,139,947 236 17,542 40,288 170.7 
ITablel: Number of tasks, task days and average daily performance. 
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to offset rhe purchase cost or support the 
donor's disbursement. In one instance, 
heavy demining equipment, donated in 
1997, was unsuitable and rarely in use. Ir 
has been described as "52 tons of scrap. " 
Another donation, a 37 ton machine, 
cleared a mere 274,000 sq meters in a 
six-month period (a figure rhar should 
have been achieved in less than a month) 
and failed to do any other work for more 
than a year. Borh machines were donated 
to the non-commercial sector, and the cost 
of the poor equipment is included as parr 
of the intended donation. 
In 1998, a set of productivity norms 
was established as parr of the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Mine Action C enter 
(BHMAC) standards. Although these 
norms caused strong debate, they were 
originally intended to provide a simplistic 
format to illustrate a theoretical assessment. 
The production of performance norms was 
intended to guide inspectors and monitors, 
bur rhe figures ended up being used in a 
regulatory manner. The commercial and 
NNGO sector's daily performance figures, 
which were generally higher than the stared 
norm regardless of site conditions, were 
now controlled by these figures. The non-
commercial organisations rarely reached the 
performance norms, so B HMAC's standards 
had lirrle effect on their daily performance. 
E..1.ch task sire varies in size, vegetation, 
soil condition and site difficulty. In addi-
tion, there are logistics and administration 
problems, which may vary between 
organisations. Therefore, each implementing 
organisation should assess each sire 
separately in order to select the best 
method. The productivity norms 
stipulated the amount of work for each 
method. Unfortunately, rhe norms, 
rather than being used as guidelines, 
were sometimes impos ed in a n 
unnecessarily restrictive manner. 
Results of the Analysis of 
Data: Mines Destroyed, 
Land Cleared and Tasks 
Undertaken 
Analysis of the mine data (both AP 
and AT mines) revealed rhar in a number 
of cases mines were not classified by type 
bur by the numbers found. The major 
hazard was from AP mines, whereas AT 
2
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mines were present on only 7.6 percent 
of all minefields. However, the AP, AT 
and mixed minefield classification normally 
anributed to minefields is not applicable in 
che BiH scenario. A table of achievement 
covering organisation , land cleared, 
mines destroyed and tasks completed is 
detailed below. 
T he table illustrates a threat similarity 
between three of the groups (NNGOs, 
NGOs and the C ivil Protection), while 
there is a slightly increased level of threat 
for the Commercial and Entity Armies. 
However, the "Mines Task-Avg" column 
shows that the NNGOs averaged 17 
mines per task; the commercial, NGOs 
and Entity Armies averaged 10-12 mines 
per task; and th e Civi l Pro tec tion 
organisation averaged only four mines per 
task; a hazard factor less than a quarter 
of tha t of th e NNGOs. W hi le che 
NNGOs may have had the largest 
number of tasks, they also faced the 
greater hazard per cask. 
If all tasks are alloca ted on che 
highest prio ri ty basis, then it should be 
expected that over a period of time all 
organisat ions wo ul d tend to b e 
p ro clueing similar figures. However, the 
Civil Protection not only had, by fa r, the 
smallest task size but also averaged the 
smallest number of mines per task. Their 
figures equated to around a thi rd of those 
of the Entity Armies, NGOs and com-
Ytar Org a nlsa tion Manua l Manual 
(sq m llVI day) and EDD 
Ye.ar Org. Type Tota l Land Tolal 
Cl<ar<d (In sq AP/ATMini'S 
m) 
1?% Commercial 
2002 \' <'mgc fi)!:urc 20,971.-172 13,601 
19'.!9 NNGOs 
2002 ,\\crngc figure 2,-11-1 ,930 1.376 
19'J7 NGO• 
2002 A' cragc figure 5,615.870 3 ,200 
111'./<J Chril Protcdion 
2002 • \ ,·erarr~,: ri!.!UI'C 1,697,566 950 
1998 Entil~ Armit's 
20()2 A\cnt.g~o: ligw-c 4,139,9-47 2,597 
• Figure 2:Threat , land cleared and task table. 
mercia! organisations, and a quarter of 
those of the NNGOs. Another interesting 
fact was that one commercial company 
that operated as both a prime and a sub-
contractOr destroyed more than 6,800 
AP and AT mines; that is more than 3 I 
percent of all mines found in BiH. 
Cost, Threat and Task 
Comparisons 
T he conclusions on the effective use 
of donations are clear. While a number 
of facts were unknown , most of which 
concerned manpower and finance, the 
results of all the available data proves chat 
the commercial/NNGO groups were far 
greater "value for money" than the non-
commercial sector. A comparison of the 
number of tasks undertaken and the 
financial costs illustrates another dramatic 
d iffe rence between the commercia l/ 
M<ch/Man MKhiMan Unknown 
(sq m ava day) a nd EDD (MethodNK ) 
(sq m avg day) (sq 01 ave day) 
C omm en.: ia l 
1996 19%'7 460 1,039 32 1,670 182 
to 1998 38 2 995 473 135 889 
2002 19'.19 343 1,138 579 3,270 4 18 
2000 500 964 1,00 2 1, 163 419 
2001 381 654 1,881 1,152 659 
21'1:!2 428 608 1,081 807 1,:!.31 
NNGOs 
1999 1999 412 1,242 . 1,155 
tu 2000 855 671 978 
21'1:)2 2001 2 t3 501 . !-13 575 
2(~\2 62.6 428 49~ 
NGOs 
19% 19')6,7 213 4-1 JJJ 
tu 19'./M 125 16 1 
2001 1999 105 170 313 . 169 
2000 lJO 280 20-1 232 33 
200
1 2
99 199 216 172 ISS 
2002 308 
""' 
77 484 194 
CivU Protectio n 
1999 1999 14 1 
IO 2000 S4 102 53 190 87 
2002 200
1 
63 113 44 22 106 
2002 86 9-1 99 22 67 
[ntit~ Armi es 
1998 199R 29 22 . 
to 1999 37 692 121 
2002 2000 63 20 271 186 99 
200 1 127 IJ6 190 94 
2002 70 241 JZ9 53 
• Figu re 3: Method s and productivit y year by year. 
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Totnl No of Sq m Pt'r Mln.s Mints Per 
Tnsl.'§ Task Tas k-Avg Sqm 
1182 17,7-a! 12 1,542 
82 29.-150 17 1.755 
JIO 





-1 2 II 1,594 
NNGOs and the non-commercial sectors. 
Based on known costs, the commercial 
and NNGOs completed thei r tasks at an 
average cost of KM 65,098, while the 
non-commercial organisations completed 
thei r tasks at an average cost of KM 
2 1 0,526. The comparison of the threat 
(based on AP and AT mines destroyed) 
illustrates another dramatic d ifference. 
Based on known costs, the number of 
mines destroyed by the comercial and 
NNGO 's is, on average, one mine at a 
cost of KM 5,494 compared to one 
mine at a cost of KM 23,714 by the 
non-commerc ial section. 
Increase in Costs, No 
Increase in Productivity 
During the six years of the BiH 
programmem an understanding of the 
use of machines and EDDs gradually 
evolved. The table below illustrates the 
gradual introduction of mechanical 
equipment and EDD s into the BiH 
programme, initially with commercial 
organisations followed by the non -
commerc ial o rganisations. 
It should be noted that the first 
machine in BiH, the Bofers used by 
Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA), was used 
for only a cou ple of tasks and has 
remain ed parked since that rime. Not 
a single official mine clearance task has 
been cleared using this machine-yet 
more than KD 3 million was originally 
provided for mechanical clearance 
operations. In many cases, rhe machines/ 
EDDs were first used by non-commer-
cial organ isations, but later a number of 
do nors provided the items. However, 
machines and EDDs require considerable 
capital outlay and to be cost effective, musr 
significantly improve productivity. 
• 
T he management of an inregrated 
policy requires experience, knowledge of 
the assets and a sound, business-like ap-
proach to thei r utilisation. What became 
evidenr was that while assets have been 
introduced by rhe non-commercial 
organisations over a long period of rime, 
productivity has nor noticeably increased. 
While commercial companies have to 
offset capital costs by improved produc-
civity, donors provide non-commercial 
organisations with EDDs and machines 
bur do nor demand an increase in pro-
duct
ivity 
and effectiveness. Therefore, 
th ere is no ince n t ive for the non-
comme rcial o rgan isa t ions to offset 
the cos t. If assets are poorly managed, 
rather than having benefits (in terms of 
improved safety and/or quality or a 
greater ourput) organisations merely have 
a greater capital outlay. In effect, donors 
who provide additional resources such 
as machines an d EDDs , but do nor 
demand an increase in output, simply 
con done ineffectiveness. 
An analysis of rhe NGO data for 
2002 ill ustrated cha t several new 
organisations were extremely productive. 
Increased production was found to be a 
result of the commercial-style manage-
ment of these organisations. In one case, a 
commercial company was also the owner 
of the NGO. In a number of other cases, 
the non-commercial organisations utilised 
commercial companies for management 
and/or th e supply of machines or EDDs. 
This prompts the question of what is 
the diffe rence, from an effectiveness 
perspective, between an NGO and a 
commercial organisation? Both are un-
dertaking mine act ion activities and 
both are, therefore, conducting humani-
tarian work to humanitarian standards. 
Any human itarian activity should also 
require rhar work be conducted in an 
efficient and effective manner-the only 
primary difference is that one works for profit 
and the other does not. In the case of 
organisations that have no experience, no 
equipmenr and no manpower, bur srill use 
highly productive sub-contractOrs to work 
on their behalf, it also raises rhe question 
of how they can be awarded accreditation, 
successfully pass a technical contract 
assessm ent and presumably underbid 
other more established organisations. 
Year Organisation Costs Per Sq m Land Cleared (In sq Total Cost 
Tyi)e m) 
1996 Comm erc ial KM 3.6 or $ 1.8 34,839,785 KM 125, 423,226 
2002 Estimated as ($ 62,711.6 13) 
Or&anlsaUon Costs Per Sq m Land Cleared Total Cost 
Yeor Type 
1996 Commercial KM 3.6 o• $ 1.8 20,971,472 KM 75,497 ,299 
200 2 Estimated as ($ 37,7-'8,6-'9! 
1999 NNGO s KM 2.81 Or $ 1.40 2,414,930 KM 6, 785,9 53 
2002 Estimated as ($ 3,392,977) 
19'.r7 NG Os KM 2.81 or $ 1.40 5, 615,870 KM 15,780,594 
2002 l:islimalcda s ($ 7,890,297) 
1999 Ch·ll Prot ecti on KM 2.81 or $ 1.40 1,697,566 KM 4,770,160 
200 2 Esti mated as ($ 2,385,080) 
1999 Entity Armie s KM 2.81 or $ 1.40 4,139,947 KM 11,633,251 
200 2 F.~timaled as ($ 5,816,625) 
Total Commercial and 34,839, 785 KM 114,467,257 
Non-Com mercial ($ 57,233,628) 
. . 
• Figure 4: Estimate of costs based on Commerc1ai/NNGO costs to clear 34.8 m11l1on sq. meters . 
What the Mine Clearance 
of 34.8 Million Square 
Meters of Mine-Affected 
Land Could (or Should) 
Have Cost 
The cost ro the donor or client of 
commercial demining in BiH, on a range 
of terra ins, site difficulties and various 
methods, fell from an average of more than 
KM 4.16 ($2.08 U.S.) per sq min 1996-
1997, to an average ofKM 3.17 ($1.58) 
in 2002. The average price over the six-year 
period was KM 3.60 ($ I .80) per sq m. The 
NNGOs, also operating in a variety of ter-
rains and site conditions and using different 
methods, achieved a price of around KM 
2.81 ($1.41) in 1999; thei r average price 
in 2002 was below KM 2.50 ($1 .25). The 
average commercial costs from 1998 were 
under KM 4.0 per sq m. From 200 I to 
2002, commercial companies averaged less 
than KM 3. 10 per sq m . The results 
i 11 ustrate that, if the commercial companies 
had conducted all of the demining, the 
total cost fo r clearing 34.8 mi llion sq 
meters wou ld have been KM 125.5 
mil lion ($62.7 million) . H owever, 
based on commercial and NNGO 
costs, the actual cost of demining in 
BiH could have been as lirtle as KM 114.5 
million ($57.25 million), instead ofbe-
rween K.M 240 million and K.M 290 
million (a figure that includes additional 
unrecorded donations that are estimated 
to be around KM 50 million). T his 
amoLmt (KM 240 million) is for the clearance 
casks and does not include the costs for the 
structure, mine risk education (MRE) or 
for mine victim assistance (MVA). 
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A minimum ofKM 160 million (or 
as high as KM 210 million) has been used 
by the non-commercial groups. In addi-
tion ro lower costs, the commercial / 
NNGO option would have considerably 
reduced rhe rime taken to complete the 
tasks, a facror deemed to be just as im-
portant, if not more so, than the reduc-
tion in costs. 
What BiH Demining Could 
Have Achieved (Based on 
Available Finance and 
Known Costs) 
If the non-commercial organisations 
had utilised the same modus operandi as 
commercial organisations and NNGOs, 
then the estimated omput for the same 
cost could have been greatly increased. 
The study was able to assess the actual 
costs for a number of organisations, and 
by so doing estimated how much land 
could have been cleared using the esti-
mated funds donated by national authori-
ties. Based on a commerciai/NNGO 
output, and using an assessment of their 
salary and associated insurance costs (each 
group was different) the costs per sq meter 
would range from $2.81 to as low as 
$2.10. 
While rhe figures show a consider-
able difference between che commercial/ 
NNGOs and the non-commercial 
groups, it should be noted that these figures 
do nor include the so-called "missing" 
donations or the lower operational costs 
of the Civil Protection and Entity Armies. 
The facts are that the NNGO 
organisations, working for no profit, in a 
3
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• Figure 5: Estimate of 
possible achievement 
(sq m and cost s) 
commercial and NGOs. 




Year Organisation Cost Per Sq m 
Type 
1996 Commercial KM 3.6 or $ 1.8 
2002 Estimated as 
1999 NNGOs KM 2.81 Or$ 1.40 
2002 Estimated as 
1997 NNGOs KM 2.81 or $ 1.40 
2002 Estimated as 
1996 Grand Total 
2002 
Year Organisation Cost Per Sq m 
TyJ>e 
19% Commercial KM 3.6or $ 1.8 
2002 A \'cragc Actual 
Cost 
1999 NNGOs KM 2.81 Or$ 1.40 
2002 A ,·crage Actual 
C:osl 
1997 NGOs KM 2.81 or $ 1. 
2002 Estimated Cosl 
1999 Civil Protection KM 2.30or $1 
2002 Estimated Cost 
1999 Entit~· Arm ics KM2.10or$1 
2002 Eslimaled C:osl 
Grand Total 
similar environmem, could potentially 
have cleared 57 million more sq meters 
for rhe same amount of money, as opposed 
to the 11.4 million sq meters that was 
achieved-an increase of 45.6 million sq 
meters or 400 percent. The estimate of 
possible achievement brings together a 
combination of factors, and illustrates 
that considerably more clearance could 
have been achieved had more emphasis 
been placed on the effective usc of donations. 
It should also be emphasised that with 
properly priorirised site selection the 
possible increase could have been as high 
as 25 percent more rhan indicated. In other 
words, for a cost of KM 242 million, an 
estimated output of 116.9 million sq 
meters could have arguably been achieved. 
Summary 
The study attempted ro revi ew ev-
ery aspecr of the demining process, 
comparing organisation types and their 
individual and collective demining efforr. 
It also reviewed a number of ocher aspects 
that have an influence on effectiveness, 
such as the need for a balanced response 
to funding, the importance of timely 
donations and the selection of the most 
suitable ground conditions. In addition, 
an example of the various time, effort, 
method and costs illustrated the impor-
tance, not just of rime and site selection, 
Sq m Cleared Total Cost 
20,971,472 KM 75,497,299 
($ 37,748,650) 
2,414,930 KM 6,785,953 
($ 3,392,977) 
56,939,501 KM 160,000,000 
($ 80,000,000) 
80,325,903 KM 242,283,252 
($ l2J,J .U,626) 
Sq Ill Cleared Total Cost 
20,971,472 KM 75,497,299 
($ 37.748,650) 
2,414,930 KM 6,785,953 
($ 3,392,977) 
14,944,750 
10,224,808 KM 160,000,000 
($ 80,000.000) 
44,994,374 
93,550,334 KM 242,283,252 
($ 121.141.626) 
bur also the selection of the most effec-
tive method. In order to work effectively 
throughout the year, many decisions 
about when, where and how to work need 
to be made. Realistically, it will not 
always be possible to achieve the ideal 
effectiveness optimization. The study 
proved char at presem, many of the criti-
cal elemems for achieving effectiveness 
are not even considered. The facts are that: 
• Many donations are not mad e 
available in rime to achieve the most 
effective results. 
• Sire selection, based on the best 
conditions to achieve effective demining, 
is rarely considered. 
• Commerciai!NNGOs completed 
more sq meter!KM ($) rhan the non-
commercial with fewer personnel. 
• Commercial and NNGOs have 
completed more tasks/KM ($) than the 
non-commercial. 
• Commercial and NNGOs have 
destroyed more mines/KM ($) chan the 
non-commercial . 
• The average cost per sg meter un-
dertaken by the non-commercial groups 
is at lease five rimes higher than the 
average cost per sq meter of the com-
mercial/NNGOs groups. 
• The commerciai/NNGOs work 
more hours per day and more days per 
month than the non-commercial sector. 
• Many donors stated that they 
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are "not interested" in their donati on 
being utilised more effective ly. 
• In BiH, political, institutional and 
personal views have had a negati ve 
impact on the effective use of donations; 
political and international objectives have 
delayed the effective creation of a sus-
tainable national capaci ty. 
• Donors are supporting more 
projects that have little or no effect on 
improving productivity, cost effectiveness 
or the removal of the cause. 
• While annual output has remained 
at around 6 to 6.7 million sg meters, the 
number of tasks and mines destroyed has 
gradually dec reased since 2000; yet, 
technical survey and the increased n um-
ber of deminers since 1999 should have 
dramatically increased the sq meters 
cleared and number of tasks completed. 
The lack of a balanced, business-like 
approach that addresses safety, quality, 
productivity and effectiveness, at inter-
national, institutional and organisational 
levels, as well as at the national mi ne 
action programme level, is obvious. The 
lack of char balanced approach, coupled 
with the ineffective management of those 
responsible for implementing donations 
unnecessarily, prolongs the suffering of 
affected populations. Yet, we still obtain 
these donations "In the name of human-
icy." If we are truly humanitarian we need 
to focus more on removing the threat of 
landmines as quickly and as safely as pos-
sible so that affected countries can begin 
the long process of post-conflict recovery. • 
in order to 1 iew the full study, check out 
www. eandii. com. 









From Kosovo to 
Afghanistan, Cluster 
Bombs Again 
Cluster bombs have created problems in several countries, as they are one 
of the many unexploded hazards often left behind after a conflict. This article 
gives an overview of the threat and shows how the organization lntersos 
has been working to help clear up the problem. 
by Fernando Termentini, 
/ntersos 
Background 
Cluster bomb units (CBUs) are 
well known from the Gulf War to post-
Dayton Bosnia, bur they were completely 
forgotten by the Ottawa Treacy, which 
didn't recognize them as APLs. In Kosovo 
and in Afghanistan, they have proven to 
be more dangerous chan APLs. 
Cluster bombs are UXO char became 
well known in Italy when some fishermen 
found them in their nets in the Adriatic 
Sea. Apart from the fishermen, whose 
security was threatened, nobody at rhar 
rime spoke out in Italy about the fi.1ture 
danger: hundreds of these UXO would 
spread in Kosovo and Serbian territory, 
killing and injuring people, mostly children. 
In fact, CBUs don't have a self-deactivating 
device that disables them if they do not 
explode, so they remain as a long-lasting 
danger for civilians, and they can explode 
with a slight touch or upon removal. 
Modern CBU models are BL-7 and 
BL-755, made in the United Scares, and 
MK-41, made in the United Kingdom. 
They are the "elder sisters" of the weapons 
used in Kuwait and of the KB-1 used by 
Serbs and Muslim Bosnian people during 
the Balkan Wars. 
CBUs differ from APLs in their 
appearance, the former being more 
colourful and intriguing, so chat they 
can trigger people's curiosity. An APL 
is basically a defensive ordnance with a 
local target, while a CBU is an offensive 
ordnance with a wide-area target. CBUs 
are real unexploded craps with much 
more explosive capaci ty than APLs, as 
an APL can kill at a range of 50 m, while 
a CBU can be fatal at a range of 150m. 
In fact, CBUs are dropped during 
air raids in dispensers with a capacity 
of more than 200 bombs each, landing 
randomly on the ground. When they 
do not explode, they hide in the grass 
or under the ground, up to 50 em deep, 
so char nobody can really cell where 
they are. In principle, APLs should be 
mapped, making their identification, 
markina and clearance easier and allowing 0 
civilians to avoid them. CBU impact 
areas, instead, are very wide targets, diffi-
cult to identicy and map before systematic 
surveys and clearance are carried out. 
They can be identified scarring from 
their drop point, if known, or by tracing 
them on the ground in a sequence. 
CBUs in Kosovo 
CBU producers claim a dud rate 
nor higher chan five percent, bur according 
to our field experience, the actual 
percentage is much more significant. 
At the end of th e war, in fact, the 
biggest and most urgent problem of 
Kosovo was that of unexploded CBUs. 
In rhe spri ng of 2000, CBUs were 
spread everywhere on the ground, 
hindering the economi c development 
and agriculwral activities after the 
winter of war. 
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• The BL-97 (top and bottom) 
In those days, we knew exactly where 
90 percent of Kosovo's mines were, 
because the Serbs handed over the maps 
of registered mined areas to the interna-
tional community. But we didn't know 
with the same accuracy where CBUs had 
been dropped. In fact, we had little news 
on Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) 
coordinates of dropping points, which 
made it virtually impossible to fix the 
accual affected areas and quantifY rhe real 
problem. 
Immediately, the international 
community launched an appeal to quickly 
4
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